range at 150 plus, bomber and fighters— an
rffort of (say) 100 plus. They were disposed as
follows: —
Prachaub G irik h a n ........................10
Mesoht
T ak / ............................. ........40 •
Bangkok ... ... ... 70 +
Lampang \ .............................
Chiengmai J J
Our effort on the 31st January was 35 plus.
51. Reinforcement of the enemy air force
took place during February. The strength of
the enemy air force which joined action with
up rose to.200 plus— an effort of (say) 140 plus
— disposed at: —
B h isa n u lo k e ................ 20 +
Bangkok ................
30 +
Nagorn Sawan 20 +
Tak and Mesoht 20 +
Moulmein ................ 30
Chiengmai ................ 40 +
Lampang 40 +
Our effort on February 14th was 53 plus.
52. Singapore fell on the 15th February and
Rangoon on the 7th March. During this period
and up to the 21st March the enemy had again
brought up reinforcements, bringing his total
air force, based largely on our airfields in
the Rangoon area South of Tharrawaddy and
Toungoo, to 400 plus— an effort of {say) 260
plus. This was the opinion of the Intelligence
staff at Burwing. I considered it on the high
side.
53. Some corroboration for this, however, is
provided b y the fact that intelligence from
China and other sources has since indicated
the presence in Burma and Thailand of some 14
air regiments of the Japanese Army Air Force.
This would comprise a force of 420 to 500 plus
aircraft.
Our total effort on March 21 st when the
Magwe action commenced was 42, of which 14
were at Akyab.
54. Japanese Fighter equipment. — Of
Japanese fighter equipment there were three
types: the Arm y 97 with a fixed undercarriage;
the Army 0.1 (an A 'm y 97 with slightly im
proved performance and a retractable under
carriage) and the Naval “ 0 ” fighter. The
former two were manoeuvrable with a top speed
of 270 miles an hour at 15,000 feet and a climb
of 2,500 feet per minute. Armament consisted
of 2 machine guns. No self-sealing tanks and
no armour were fitted. Similarly, the N avy
“ O ” had neither armour nor self-sealing
tanks. It had, however, two 20 millimetre
machine guns in addition to 2 machine guns of
the Vickers’ type. This aircraft was much
superior in performance to the Army 97, having
a tnp speed of 315 miles an hour at t o .000 feet,
a good climb and good manoeuvrability. It
was, however, slightly inferior to the P .40 and
the Hurricane II, part’cularly at medium
heights. At heights above 20,000 feet the
Hurricane II was definitely superior.
55. All three types were convertible to long
range fighters with a radius of over 500 miles.
Two jettlsonnble petrol tanks were fitted. Even
without such tanks both types were superior
in range to our short range interceptor fighter
having a radius of act’on of over 250 miles
instead of the 135 miles of the Hurricane II.
56. Japanese Bomber equipment.— In respect
of bombers, the Arm y 97 heavy bomber was
mostly employed. It had a cruising speed of
about 200 miles an hour, a radius of action of
700 miles and a service ceiling of 25,000 feet.
With a full load of petrol its lift was tons of
bombs— a formidable bomber. Indeed such
range and bomb lift placed great flexibility in
the hands of the enemy air command. This
type was used for day bombing and occa
sionally for night bombing operations, and had
a crew of 7. No self-sealing tanks nor armour
were fitted.
57. Although air fighting frequently look
place over scrub or jungle country, 32 crashed
enemy fighters and bombers were located on the
ground up to the fall of Rangoon. Technical
examination of these— although many were
burnt or otherwise destroyed beyond recogni
tion— established the quality of equipment
about which little was previously known.
58. Effect of equipment.— Thus the enemy
with their long range fighters were able to reach
out over great distances and to destroy our first
line aircraft on the ground. There were de
cisive instances of this kind in the Malayan
campaign. Consequently unless airfields, both
for bombers and fighters, had a good warning
system— i.e. a time warning the equivalent of
at least 50 miles— the enemy fighters, achieving
surprise, would come in and by deliberate low
flying attacks and good shooting could be relied
upon to cause great damage to first line air
craft, if not indeed to destroy them all. This
form of attack could well be met by a good
ground defence, including an adequate number
of Bofors (predictor controlled), automatic
weapons and P .A .C ., but in the campaign in
Burma we were extremely weak in these forms
of defence.
59. As regards bombers, such range and
bomb lift gave the enemy a wide choice in the
selection of objectives and great flexibility. If
warning of such attacks, particularly those
carried out at high altitude, was not adequate,
a bomb lift of considerable weight, accurately
aimed, could be expected on the objective.
Operating in formations of not less than 27,
such a pattern of "some 27 tons of small light
A.P. and H .E. bombs causes great damge to
first line aircraft and P .O .L ., even though dis
persal and anti-blast protection has been pro
vided. If such protection is not provided results
may well be decisive and the provision of such
protection requires time and labour— two needs
that in the hurried movement of war m ay not
be available.
60. Comparison of Air equipment.— Thus we
were much inferior to the enemy; in the first
place in numbers, in the second place in the
vital factor of restricted range in our fighters,
in the third place range, bomb lift and speed
of our bombers. The enemy, on the other hand,
suffered the grave disadvantage of not having
armour and self-sealing tanks, both charac
teristics of all our types, while from the point
of view of the air battle, the Hurricane II was
a much superior fighter to the Arm y 97, slightly
superior to the Naval " 0 ” and quite decisive
against such ill-defended bombers as the
Armv 97. The P .40 was comparable to die
Hurricane IT, particularly in medium altitude
fighting. With its fine clean dive and armament
of .5's it could be relied upon to do as much