44
SUPPLEMENT to t h e LONDON GAZETTE, 2 JANUARY, 1947
61. The proportion of successes in this respect was as follows: —
Force Cat “ A ” Cat “ 13 ” Cat “ C
A .E .A .F .......................................................................... 14 2 2
R.A.F. Bomber C om m and....................................... 22 15 2
U.S. Eighth Air Force ....................................... 15 8 —
62. In the period of the operation of this rail selected targets and dropped a total weight of
plan, i.e., 9th February to D-Day, a total of 66,517 tons of bombs. The scale of effort was
21,949 aircraft operated against tlie eighty as follows: —
Force Sorties Bombs
A .E .A .F.......................................................................... 8,736 10,125 tons
R.A.F. Bomber Command ... ........................... 8,751 44,744 tons
U.S. Eighth Air Force ....................................... 4,462 11,648 tons .
21,949 66,517 tons
63. In the attacks made by the United States
Fifteenth Air Force on 25th May, 1944, anc^ the
subsequent two days, 1,600 sorties were flown
against 14 targets and 3,074 tons of bombs were
dropped. Of these 14 targets allocated in
Southern France, at D-Day five were Category
“ A " , one was Category “ B " and eight were
Category “ C ” .
64. The first of the really heavy and damag
ing attacks on rail centres was that made by
Royal Air Force Bomber Command on Trappes
on the night of 6th-7th March, 1944.
65. An immediate interpretation of photo
graphs taken after this attack showed extremely
heavy damage throughout the yards, the greatest
concentration of craters being in the “ Up ”
reception sidings. 190 direct hits were scored
on tracks, as many as three tracks having, in
several cases, been disrupted by one bomb.
Numerous derailments and much wreckage were
caused by 50 bombs which fell among the lines
of rolling stock with which the yard was
crowded. All the tracks of the main electrified
line between Paris and Chartres which passes
through this yard were cut, several of the over
head standards having been hit, and at the east
end of the yard, at least five direct hits were
scored on the constriction of lines. To the north
east of the target, the engine shed was two-thirds
destroyed.
66. Of the other early attacks carried out in
March and early April, some of the most suc
cessful were those on Paris/La Chappelle,
Charleroi/St. Martin, Paris/Juvisy, Laon and
Aachen, at each of these centres the locomotive
•servicing and maintenance facilities were ren
dered almost, if not completely, useless and
great havoc was wrought in the marshalling
yards. At Paris/Noisy le Sec, the whole railway
complex was almost annihilated. Other damag
ing attacks in this early period were made on
Ottignies, Rouen, Namur, Lens and Tergnier.
Nine of these 11 attacks were carried out by
R .A .F. Bomber Command.
67. From the first attacks, the enemy ener
getically set about endeavouring to make good
the damage inflicted, but Trappes, first attacked
by Bomber Command on 6th-7th March, 1944,
was still under repair at the end of April.
68. For the effort involved, the results of the
attack on Charleroi/St. Martin on 18th April,
1944, are worth citing, but this attack is only
typical of many of these blows at the enemy
communications. A force of 82 Marauders and
37 Bostons of the United States Ninth Air Force
attacked the railway centre between 1835 and
1905 hours, dropping a total of 176 tons of
bombs on the target. Photographic interpreta
tion after this attack showed that the locomotive
repair shop and two locomotive depots were
very heavily damaged. The marshalling yard
was ploughed up and all through traffic stopped.
A single through track was later established
on the north side of the yard and was completed
by 2nd May, 1944, 14 days later. A double
track through the marshalling yard was re-estab
lished by n th May, 1944, but at D-Day (6th
June), the marshalling yard was still unservice
able and the repair facilities could not be used.
69. During the last days of April and
throughout the month of May, 1944, the same
high degree of success achieved by the early
attacks was maintained. A growing paralysis
was being extended over the rail networks of
the Region Nord, west of a line Paris-Amiens-
Boulogne and South Belgium. In these areas,
all the principal routes were, at one time or
another, interrupted. Other centres to the east
and south of Paris had also been attacked.
70. In the last week of April, Aulnoye,
Villeneuve-St. Georges, Acheres, Montzen, St.
Ghislain, Arras and Bethune were all attacked.
During May, the heaviest attacks were made on
Mantes/Gassicourt, Liege, Ghent, Courtrai,
Lille, Ilasselt, Louvain, Boulogne, Orleans,
Tours, Le Mans, Metz, Mulhouse, Rheims,
Troyes and Charleroi.
71. Photographic interpretation continued to
show the devastating effect on the centres
attacked, and other intelligence sources con
firmed this evidence, as well as supplying indi
cations of damage to signals and ancillary ser
vices, damage which did not appear in photo
graphs.
72. In order to extend the paralysis inflicted
on the regions north and west of Paris, attacks
were made in the period immediately before
D-Day, on the eastern routes to Paris and the
important avoiding routes round the south of
that city, and on centres on the Grande Cein-
ture. Attacks on these centres were considerably
restricted by the necessity of avoiding causing
heavy civilian casualties or damage to historic
buildings. A typical example of this restriction
was furnished by the important junction of Le
Bourget which, because of the strong proba
bility of bombing causing heavy civilian casual
ties, was not attacked at all.
73. At D-Day, I believed the primary object
of the rail plan had been fully realised. The
events which followed confirmed my belief.
After the Allied advance, enquiry from the