and resume his advance along the north
bank of the m ain branch. In the counter
march he w ould lose 24 c ritica l hours.
The I I Panzer D ivision, m eanwhile, bat
tered against the defenders of N oville, fin a lly
pushing the Am ericans aside d u ring the
afternoon o f December 20. This division be
longed to the X L V II Panzer Corps, com
manded by General H einrich F re ih e rr von
L iittw itz , whose responsibility included
Bastogne. A lthough L iittw itz was preoccu
pied w ith ta k in g the town, he had other
troops to do i t w ith , including the Panzer
Lehr D ivision. W hile these troops probed
the Bastogne perim eter, encircling the tow n
in the process, L iittw itz sent the II Panzer
D ivision pushing on to the west.
That n ig h t (the 20th) the d ivision’s recon
naissance battalion got across the O urthe at
O urtheville on a bridge th a t 116th Panzer
had neglected to storm in the b e lie f the
Am ericans w ould destroy it, as they had a ll
others. Y et the A m erican dem olitions un
accountably had failed, and the I I Panzer
D ivision got across the O urthe dryshod.
The Meuse now lay only 23 m iles to the
west. B u t for a reason th a t seemed inex
plicable at the tim e to the little bands of
Am erican defenders who s till stood in the
way, the II Panzer D ivision came to a halt.
In the north, in the meantim e, the decision
to send the 82nd A irborne D ivision s k irtin g
the south flank o f Peiper’s trapped tanks to
push up to the Salm riv e r behind the St
V ith horseshoe proved to be exceptionally
provident. A dvancing w ith o u t opposition,
the airborne troops dropped off u nits along
the w ay to face southward in the direction
of Houffalize, thus affording some block
should the 116th Panzer D ivision and ac
companying in fa n try units swing northw ard.
By the m orning of the 21st, the rest of the
paratroops were in position along the Salm,
facing the west, where d u ring the day the
Germans were fin a lly to w rest the tow n of St
V ith from the 7th Arm oured D ivision and
the m ixed units th a t had held it for over
five days.
As n ig h tfa ll came on December 21, the
battle from the Am erican view point s till was
going badly:
• St V ith and its roads was now open to the
Germans, w ith Am erican w ith d ra w a l from
the portion o f the horseshoe s till in th e ir
hands inevitable. Peiper was s till dangerous,
even though trapped;
• The situation on the southern shoulder of
the German penetration was s till fluid;
• The delaying forces in fro n t of Bastogne
were a ll b u t destroyed, leaving the lig h tly
armed 101st A irborne D ivision, encircled in
Bastogne, to m uster such support as could
be salvaged to defend against an entire
German corps;
• One German Panzer division was across
the O urthe riv e r 23 m iles from the Meuse,
another was at H ouffalize presum ably pre
paring to resume the tre k westward;
• Ever since the sta rt of the German attack
on the 16th, fog and low overcast had denied
a ll but the most daring (and usually un
productive) sorties by Am erican fighter-
bombers.
Yet, as is so often the case in battle, the
other side saw the situation in another lig h t.
As early as the th ird day, December 18,
the German arm y group commander, Field-
M arshal W alter Model, had come to the con
clusion th a t the counteroffensive had fallen
short. This m ay have been m erely an in itia l
reaction of surprise and fru stra tio n th a t the
opening blows had failed to penetrate the
The price
of violating the
rules of war...
‘Scarface’ Skorzeny, Hitler’s master
commando. His men, dressed in American
uniforms, spread chaos and confusion
behind the US lin e s -b u t those who were
caught paid the inevitable price before
the firing squads
A m erican line as quickly as planned. Yet
even H itle r had expressed at least ta cit con
cern by cancelling a projected supporting a t
tack by the X V A rm y against thinned A m e ri
can lines near Aachen. B u t th a t was before
the II Panzer D ivision achieved its spectacu
la r gain across the O urthe river. So th rille d
was the F iih re r w ith th is development th a t
he afforded Field-M arshal von R undstedttw o
divisions from the general reserve to be
employed as Rundstedt him se lf decided.
There were continuing problems on the
German side nevertheless. The Americans
at the northern corner on the Elsenborn
Ridge s till held, a rock against w hich the V I
Panzer A rm y could b u t batter in vain, re
s trictin g D ie tric h ’s arm our to two of the
four m ain roads intended for the advance
westward, and one of those under heavy
Am erican a rtille ry fire. T hat was w hy the
rem ainder of the I SS Panzer D ivision was so
slow to follow Peiper’s lead, and w hy
Peiper had been trapped. He eventually lost
39 tanks and the rest o f his transport and
equipm ent, w ith only 800 out o f an orig in a l
force of 2,000 men at last in filtra tin g back
to safety.
N or could D ie trich ’s other three SS Panzer
divisions be brought to bear through this
narrow passage: a ll efforts to do so produced
traffic spill-over into the zone of the V Panzer
A rm y around St V ith . A t one point Field-
M arshal Model personally helped direct
tra ffic near St V ith and came upon General
von M anteuffel doing the same thing. So
c ritic a l was the ja m th a t Field-M arshal
von Rundstedt on the 21st ordered two of
D ie tric h ’s SS Panzer divisions transferred
southward to M anteuffel, whose V Panzer
A rm y henceforth w ould compose the Ger
man m ain effort. A s h ift southward o f the
boundary between the two armies, g iving St
V ith to D ietrich, was p a rt o f the plan.
For a ll the success of II and 116th Panzer
D ivisions in bypassing St V ith to the south
and stream ing westward between St V ith
and Bastogne, the fa ilu re to capture these
two road centres early in the fig h tin g had
sharply restricted M anteuffel’s dash for the
Meuse. A nd even after General von L iitt-
w itz ’s spearheads had draw n up to Bastogne
on the 19th, he had been slow to launch a
comprehensive attack because thaw ing
roads leading up from the eastern riv e r
valleys slowed the a rriv a l of supporting
a rtille ry .
Shortages o f fuel crimped German opera
tions everywhere, the most drastic shortage
h ittin g II Panzer D ivision, preventing th a t
fro n t-ru n n in g force from m oving at a ll on
the 21st. The shortages developed p a rtly
because the Germans had failed to capture
any large A m erican stocks, b ut also because
awesome tra ffic jam s plagued the steep,
serpentine, icy roads behind the lines in the
E ifel. One of D ie tric h ’s Panzer divisions used
up its fuel battering against the Elsenborn
Ridge. W hen on the 21st Rundstedt ordered
two of D ie trich ’s divisions to be transferred
to M anteuffel, there w ould n o t—for 36
hours —be enough fuel to allow one of the
divisions to move.
German commanders also had to keep
looking over th e ir le ft shoulders, for how
long w ould it be before Patton w ould throw
his 3rd A rm y against the German southern
flank? How long, too, before the fog and over
cast parted to enable the deadly Am erican
fighter-bom bers to jo in the battle?
[ ¦ Charles B. MacDonald’s biography is in Vol
5, p. 2016.]
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